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Introduction and summary
Risk managers use a peeling an onion analogy to
illustrate their prioritization of risk management activ-
ities. The resulting priorities have produced the con-
tracting innovations needed to manage the outer
layers of this risk onion. These tools are derivative
contracts whose values are driven by changes in
interest rates, equity prices, and foreign exchange
rates. Having dealt with these outer layers, todays
risk managers are paying increasing attention to the
inner layers of the onion, most especially credit risk.
Furthermore, globalization of the financial markets is
increasing diversification opportunities. To remain
competitive in the global marketplace, financial insti-
tutions whose borrowers are concentrated in certain
business or geographic sectors are seeking methods
to improve their diversification of credit exposures.
The efforts of risk managers are proceeding on
two fronts. First, they are developing methods to mea-
sure credit risk exposures. Three of the better known
procedures for measuring credit exposures are the
Expected Default Frequency metric developed by
KMV,1 J. P. Morgans CreditMetrics,2 and Credit
Suisses CreditRisk+.3 Second, risk managers are en-
gineering derivative contracts to enable transference
of credit risk exposures.4 This article examines some
of these contracts and compares this new risk man-
agement route with a traditional route for managing
loan loss exposures.
Descriptions of growth prospects for the credit
derivatives market in terms such as the next interest
rate swap stem from a confluence of events. Smithson
(1997) points out that the first steps came as over-
the-counter (OTC) derivatives dealers began to recog-
nize the need to manage their credit exposures to one
another. This recognition led to efforts to quantify and
then to create structures controlling credit risk expo-
sures. One such structure is the derivative product
company (DPC), in which derivative contracts are
booked in a subsidiary that then books an offsetting
position with its parent.5 Such structures shift broad
market exposures, most often to interest rates, from
the subsidiary to the parent firm while retaining credit
exposures to original counterparties at the subsidiary
level. These structures are motivated by the need to
raise the credit ratings of OTC dealers and improve
their ability to compete for business. DPC structures
isolate credit risk from other risk sources. This enables
institutions to allocate capital directed at credit risk
concerns. In addition, DPC structures motivate special-
ization in credit risk management.
Recently, attention has focused on transferring
credit risk from one party to another using credit
derivative contracts. Various contracting schemes are
now labeled credit derivatives. The common feature
of these risk management tools is that they retain
assets on the books of originating institutions, while
transferring some portion of the credit exposure inher-
ent in these assets to other parties. This accomplishes
several objectives. Originating institutions have a
vehicle that transfers credit risk without requiring the
sale of the asset. When asset sales weaken an insti-
tutions relationships with its borrowers, a vehicle
transferring only the credit exposure permits the insti-
tution to retain its relationship. In addition, the ability










be used to improve diversification. For example, an
institution with loan concentrations in a problem
industry can lessen credit exposures by swapping
its exposures in the problem industry for credits
from a broader borrowing segment. Thus, following
an oil price decline, the credit exposures from loans
to oil exploration firms may be regarded as excessive.
A credit risk swap reduces the institutions concen-
tration in these firms to achieve a more diversified
loan portfolio.
Current regulatory policy toward credit derivatives
does not recognize their risk reducing potential. In-
stead, it emphasizes their potential use as risk increas-
ing instruments.6 Consequently, users receive only
limited relief from regulatory capital requirements.
Relief from regulatory capital requirements is available
when credit derivatives are used to hedge assets held
in bank trading books. For assets held in banking
books, regulatory capital relief is less generous, limited
to instances when the credit derivative gives a one-
to-one match with the loss experience of individual
banking-book positions. This treatment cannot be
applied to portfolio positions held within the banking
book. In addition, regulatory capital can be required
for the credit derivative itself. If holdings of regulatory
capital are costly, banks will generally find this treat-
ment restricts their use of these contracts. In contrast,
banks holdings of provisions against loan losses,
a traditional method for managing credit risk, can be
used to fulfill their tier two capital requirements.
In view of the potential for more cost-efficient
management of credit risk, current regulatory policy
toward credit derivatives needs reexamination. In this
article, I compare the outcome from a credit derivative
contract with that of loan loss provisioning, the more
traditional method of managing credit risk. The com-
parison illustrates that under some circumstances,
credit derivatives obtain the same economic outcome
and, in these circumstances, can be afforded regula-
tory treatment similar to that of the traditional risk
management method.
Review of credit derivatives
The variety of credit derivative contract forms
can obscure the common role of these contracts as
mechanisms to transfer credit risk between counter-
parties and the returns for bearing this category of risk.
The British Bankers Association (BBA) surveyed
the London market in 1996. The credit derivatives it
encountered fell into four categories. Below, I review
two of the more important contracting formats en-
countered by the BBA survey: total return swaps
and credit swaps.
Total return swaps
Figure 1 depicts the payment flows for a total
return swap. The swap exchanges the payment con-
figurations of two counterpartiesactual payments
made between the two counterparties being the net
of the respective payment configurations. The total
return payor pays out based on the return from its
holdings of a risky debt obligation or a portfolio of
risky debt obligations. Total return for risky debt is
the sum of an interest income stream and changes in
the market value of the debt. The risk of these returns
is the variability in this sum. Of particular interest for
credit risk managers are bond defaults and changes in
the prospects for subsequent default. Box 1 describes
the relationship between changes in default prospects
and credit risk. Clearly, if a bond defaults, returns from
the bond are affected by a curtailment of interest pay-
ments. In addition, the value of the debt will be affect-
ed by market assessments of value recovered through
bankruptcy proceedings. Prospects for future default
on the obligation are typically characterized as ratings
changes. Yields for risky debt adjust according to
changes in these prospects, rising when payment
prospects worsen.
The counterparty to a total return swap, the total
return receiver, bases what it pays on the returns from
a default-free obligation less the negotiated compen-
sation for taking on exposure to the risky debt. It
receives the return from the underlying risky debt. The
result of the swap is that the total return payor obtains
the income stream appropriate for a default-free obliga-
tion and the total return receiver obtains the income
stream appropriate for holdings of risky debt. The
reconfiguration of income streams is accomplished
contractually rather than by exchanging ownership
of the respective debt obligations.7
Payments based on principal repayment are
typically omitted in this contract format. Thus, the
risk reduction for total return payors is largely the
income loss from ratings downgrades, rather than the
amounts recovered from defaults. Since vehicles to




Sources of credit risk
Panel A of the figure below illustrates the payout
at maturity of a risky debt obligation. Points to the
right of the kink represent the promised payout
of the bond. When the firms value exceeds the value
of its promised payments, bondholders receive the
full value of the promised amount. To the left of the
kink, the owners of the firm default, ceding owner-
ship to the firms debt holders.
Panel B charts the probability for each possible
value of the firm. The filled-in bars represent the
distribution of probabilities based on initial infor-
mation. The most probable outcome is well above
the promised payment amount as indicated in panel
A and the probability of a zero outcome approaches
zero. The lighter-shaded bars represent a revised
distribution of probabilities such as might occur
after the release of negative news about the firms
future prospects. The most probable outcome is
shifted downward to just about the level of the
promised payment amount and a zero outcome is
a nonzero probability event.
Combining these probabilities and their re-
spective outcomes, one can calculate an expected
(probability-weighted) payment amount. Visual
inspection (correctly) suggests that the expected
payment amount declines with the revised proba-
bilities. To understand credit risk, consider that the
amounts in panel A are contractually determined.
Bond ratings are a rank-order measure of the prob-
ability that the firms ability to meet its debt obli-
gation will change; higher rankings imply less
likelihood of a change within a given period of
time. Hence, a rating downgrade implies a capital
loss because it is more likely that the firm will be


























A. Bond value at maturity
B. Distribution of firm values
firm value
known, I proceed with the assumption that the inter-
est rate exposure of the risky debt obligation is fully
hedged. This allows me to focus on the value fluctua-
tions from changes in default risk.8
Suppose a banks holding of single-A, floating-rate
debt pays 200 basis points over the reference rate. If
the reference rate is 8 percent, then the borrower is
obligated to pay 10 percent for that period. A credit
rating downgrade of the borrower that decreases the
price for that debt by 8 percent implies a total return
of 2 percent. The receiver of the total return swap is
due to be paid 2 percent for that period. The total return
payor is due to receive the 8 percent reference rate
less a spread amount of say 25 basis points, totaling
7.75 percent for the period. Payments are the net of
these amounts, so the total return payor receives 5.75
percent. Combining this receipt with the 2 percent
obtained from the payors debt holding gives a return
of 7.75 percent. Therefore, the payor locks in a 7.75
percent return. The appeal for the total return receiver
in the swap arrangement is the ability to participate in
the return stream of the underlying debt obligation
without investing in the bond itself.
As demonstrated, the total return swap increases
cash flow certainty. The traditional bank management
strategy achieves a similar end. Provisioning that
invests some assets in default-free securities also
achieves a lower bound for default losses. An important
distinction is that the provisioning strategy maintains
an inventory of liquid assets, while the credit derivative
strategy delivers cash flows as losses are realized.
Credit swaps
Compared with the total return swap, the contin-
gent payout feature of credit swap contracts comes
closer to matching features usually associated with
insurance contracts. As displayed in figure 2, fixed
payors insure against credit events by making periodic
payments of a fixed percentage of the loans par value.















loan default, the contingent payor makes a payment
compensating the insured for part of its loss. Otherwise,
the contingent payor pays zero.
Taking the defined credit event to be default on
a debt obligation, a credit swap might be structured as
follows. As before, suppose floating-rate debt rated
at single A pays 200 basis points over its reference
rate. The holder of this debt negotiates a credit swap
to insure against loss due to default. The debt holder
is a fixed payor in the contract, paying 10 basis
points per period to the contingent payor. Should the
debt issuer default on the obligation, the fixed payor
receives a preset payment. Otherwise, the contingent
payor pays out zero. The payment offsets the loss in-
curred due to the default. Contracts can be structured
in many ways, for example, payment of a fixed amount
on default or payment proportional to loss amounts.
In the case where the credit swap pays the differ-
ence between the loan principal value and the recovered
amount, the credit swap limits the loss for the defined
credit event to the value of loan principal. An invest-
ment policy combining default-free securities with
risky debt can replicate this lower bound for loss.
Thus, traditional loan loss provisioning combined
with investing provisions in default-free securities can
duplicate the benefits of a credit derivative. The differ-
ence is that the credit derivative delivers cash flows on
a just-in-time basis, while the provisioning strategy
retains cash inventories. Once credit derivatives are
understood as an alternative to traditional provisioning
and investing methods, the choice between the two
alternatives is one of cost effectiveness.
Simple model for choosing between
credit risk management tools
Credit derivatives fulfill purposes similar to those
achieved through traditional methods of credit risk
management. Suppose a bank decides its exposure to
credit risk is excessive. To lessen its exposure, it rein-
vests some of its cash flow in default-free securities
such as Treasury bills. These investments will be
labeled provisions for loan losses.9 In making this
decision, the bank foregoes other lending opportunities.
Therefore, its opportunity cost from the credit risk
management decision is the foregone return from ex-
tending loans. I compare the banks use of funds for
the loss provision and the credit derivative. When
the credit derivative can be had at a lower cost than
the funds outlay for a loss provision, the bank has an
opportunity to extend its loan portfolio. The expected
return from investing this difference in loans can exceed
the opportunity loss when banks invest in low-risk,
low-return assets.
Opportunity cost comparison of credit derivatives
and loan provisions
In one period a loan currently valued at L will
have one of two values. In the up state the borrower
repays the loan, giving the lender proceeds of uL. In
the down state, the borrower defaults on the loan and
the lender recovers the fraction d of the amount due
from the borrower. A one-period risk-free investment
can be made that returns r dollars for every dollar in-
vested in the current period. It is natural to stipulate
that in the up state the loan pays more than its current
value and in default it pays less than its current value,
so uL> L >dL. Further, since the loan is risky, its return
in the up state is larger than a parallel investment at
the risk-free rate, so uL> rL.
I assume an insurance contract can be purchased
that pays the difference between the face value of the
loan and its recovery value when the down state occurs
(more on this later). The price of this contract is based
on the current price of the loan, the payoffs in the up
and down states, and the risk-free rate of interest. I
label this contract I(L, u, d, r). I consider two invest-
ment strategies, provisioning and credit derivatives
(as shown in table 1).
Strategy 1 is the provisioning strategy. If the loan
defaults, the loss will be 1  d dollars per dollar of
loan value for a total loss of (1  d)L dollars. Investing
the amount (1  d)L/r at the risk-free rate, the one-
period payoff from provisioning is (1  d)L no matter
which state occurs. The portfolio includes the loan
that pays off uL in the up state and dL in the down
state. In the down state, proceeds from the provision-
ing investment match the loss realized on the loan.
Therefore, the bank has prefunded the loss and
locked in L, the face value of the loan. In the up state,
the bank realizes gains on both the loan and the pro-
visioning investment.
Strategy 2 uses a credit derivative contract to in-
sure against cash flow disruption. Like the provision-
ing strategy, proceeds from the credit derivative match




Comparison of outcomes from provisioning
and credit insurance contract
TABLE 1
Payout at time t + 1
Investment made at time t Up state Down state
1) (1 – d)L/r at riskless rate r
plus the loan L (1 – d)L + uL (1 – d)L + dL
2) Purchase insurance
contract I(L,u,d,r)
plus the loan L 0 + uL (1 – d)L + dL
Difference 1 – 2: (1 – d)L 0
With respect to the down state the bank is indifferent
between the two strategies. Should the up state occur,
the bank realizes uL from the loan but proceeds from
the credit derivative contract are zero. Comparing
strategies 1 and 2 in the up state, the difference is the
amount of the loan loss.
The banks decision requires comparing the time t
costs of its alternatives to obtain the up state outcomes.
To facilitate the comparison, I stipulate the existence
of additional lending opportunities matching those of
the loan considered above. The expected return from
these lending opportunities is denoted rL. The bank
has three investment alternatives: provisioning, lending,
and insuring. It can fund its provisioning account with
an outlay of (1  d)L/r. If the cost of the insurance
contract I(L, u, d, r) exceeds (1  d)L/r, the bank rules
out the insurance contract. This is because the out-
comes from insuring and provisioning are identical in
the down state and the up state return from provision-
ing dominates insuring for positive rates of interest.
When the cost of the insurance contract is equal
to or below the outlay required for the provisioning
alternative, the bank weighs the risk-adjusted expected
return from investing in loans earning the loan rate rL
against the return from its provisioning alternative. The
investable amount in loans is [(1  d)L/r  I(L, u, d, r)].10
The bank then chooses the larger of the risk-adjusted
expected payouts from the two strategies. Since in-
creasing its loans potentially improves diversification
of the banks loan portfolio, the risk increase from
new loans can be negligible.
Thus far, the comparison demonstrates that two
inventory management methods can fulfill risk man-
agement requirements. The loan provisioning strate-
gy corresponds to a static inventory by choosing
inventory levels in anticipation of future liquidity
needs. The credit derivative strategy corresponds to
a just-in-time inventory management style by con-
tracting for deliveries as needs for liquidity arise.
There are two other ways in which credit
derivatives can potentially add value, first
by improving the efficiency of capital allo-
cations and, second, by acting as a form
of reinsurance.
Regulators require that banks retain
4 percent tier one capital holdings against
risk-weighted assets. In strategy 1 the
bank must hold capital to support both
the risky loan and the default-free security.
Strategy 2 also includes the loan asset,
but replaces the security investment with
a credit derivative. When the capital re-
quired to support this asset configura-
tion is less than in strategy 1, additional
capital is freed up to support further lending activity.
Is this a plausible scenario? Consider that regulatory
agencies require capital holdings against interest rate
risk. The investment in the default-free security in-
creases interest rate risk and requires that capital be
held. Therefore, the banks avoidance of credit risk
increases its capital requirement for interest rate risk.
The alternative, an insurance contract, creates no
additional interest rate risk, therefore credit risk is
managed on par with that obtained by the security in-
vestment but with a smaller required capital outlay.
This rationale is similar to that for the DPC structure
described earlier. In both cases, isolating credit risk
from broad-market risks, such as interest rate risk,
enables more efficient capital allocations.
Finally, credit derivatives can be seen as a form
of reinsurance.11 Reinsurance markets exist to shift risks
between intermediaries. These markets become neces-
sary when geographic or other restrictions prevent
intermediaries from maintaining sufficiently well-diver-
sified portfolios. For example, a Florida insurance firm
has excessive exposure to hurricane damages and a
California insurance firm has excessive exposure to
earthquake damages. A reinsurance contract exchang-
ing their respective exposures improves the financial
performance of both firms by increasing the diversifi-
cation of each contract participant. Diamond (1984)
shows that derivative contracts used to control expo-
sure to common risks enable institutions to improve
their diversification and lower certain costs.12 These
reductions shift the margin for loans downward, in-
creasing the level of loans taken by the intermediary.
The reinsurance aspect of credit derivatives may
provide an additional and possibly more efficient
mechanism for achieving diversification.
Cost of insurance
Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979) employ risk-
adjusted probabilities to compute the expected payoff7 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
from an option contract. The risk adjustment is ob-
tained by choosing probabilities that are consistent
with an arbitrage replicating the value of the option
from investments in the underlying asset and a safe
asset. Since the arbitrage is riskless, the expected
payoff from the option is discounted at the rate for
the safe asset. Recognizing that the insurance con-
tract above can be construed as a put option, the value
of the credit derivative can be obtained using the
binomial approach developed by these authors.
Considering the insurance as a one-period con-
tract remains useful. Further, assume that the loan being
insured is a one-period loan that matures on the same
date as the option. Restricting the insurance policy in
this way avoids the need to incorporate the covariance
between the riskless rate and the rate for risky debt.
Therefore, attention is focused entirely on the credit
risk aspects of the loan rather than on any interest
rate risk. Under these conditions, the price of the in-
surance contract is
















where Iu() and Id() are, respectively, the payoffs from
the insurance contract in the up state and down state.
Adding to the comparison between credit derivatives
and loan provisions, the pricing model offers insight
into the effect of interest rates on the credit derivative
decision. As the level of rates for the safe asset rises,
the level of funding required to provision against
losses falls. In addition, the price paid for insurance
declines. The rate of decline in the price paid for in-
surance is greater.13 This implies that as interest rates
rise, the credit derivative alternative becomes increas-
ingly attractive vis-à-vis the provisioning alternative.
This pricing model assumes that the outcomes
for loans are not influenced by the purchaser of the
insurance contract. More likely, insurance contracts
will have greater appeal when the insured has a higher
expectation of loss than the insurer. These informa-
tion asymmetries, or adverse selection problems,
imply that a premium will be charged for insurance
contracts that fail to protect the insurer against her in-
formation disadvantages. Denoting this adverse selec-
tion premium r, the price of insurance is I(L, u, d, r) + r.
Smith and Warner (1979) show that joint benefits
give the insurer and the insured an incentive to
minimize adverse selection premia. My results sug-
gest that the common interests of these counter-
parties lead to contracts that reduce the banks
opportunity cost by freeing up additional funds
for lending.
However, resolving adverse selection problems
is not without cost. Contracts structured on state
variables determined outside the firm, such as a stan-
dard reference rate, can bypass adverse selection
problems. However, use of a standard reference rate
introduces basis risk. Basis risk for a credit derivative
exists when the correlation between the drivers that
determine payments due on credit derivatives does
not match the loss experience for the insured debt.
For example, a lender holding a loan issued by a specific
corporation may find that the returns of a security
within the same industry generally reflect the pros-
pects of defaults within that industry. Such a security
is likely to resolve the adverse selection problems.
However, credit problems that are unique to the indi-
vidual firm will not be reflected in the reference security
so payments based on the reference security may not
cover losses on the loans to the individual firm. So,
the resolution of adverse selection problems is ob-
tained at the cost of mismatches between payments
on the credit derivative and loan performance. This
situation introduces a margin between the cost of im-
perfect loss protection  and premia paid for adverse
selection problems. Understanding this margin enables
an improved prediction of the types of credit derivative
contracts that are most likely to succeed.
Rationales for loan provisioning
Kwan (1997) describes loan loss provisioning
as a contra asset account. The size of the account is
maintained at the level of losses the bank expects to
realize. The size decision affects earnings in two
ways. First, when a bank increases its provisions, it
defers recognition of earnings. This has tax implica-
tions, reducing current taxable income. Later, as loan
losses are realized, the provisioning account is written
down and the previously deferred earnings are recog-
nized along with the loan loss. Because the recog-
nized loss amount and the now-recognized deferred
earnings net to zero, loan losses reduce taxable income.
Second, to the extent that earnings performance
signals actual cash flow performance, then bank
managers have incentives to manage earnings levels.
For example, when the level of earnings may incorrectly
signal future prospects, managers can adjust earnings
to prevent unwarranted stock price changes. More
straightforwardly, earnings figures will be managed
when earnings are used to gauge the performance of
bank managers.
Here, I construe loan loss provisioning as follows.
The bank manages its exposure to credit risk by in-
suring that it has access to cash sufficient for its
operating requirements. It can accomplish this by in-
vesting in assets that can be readily sold to obtain8 Economic Perspectives
needed cash or, as previously discussed, using a
credit derivative to insure its access to cash. Consider
a bank constrained from using a credit derivative that
is choosing the portion of its earnings to be paid out
as dividends. A large dividend payout reduces cash
available for investment in default-free securities. By
reducing its payout, it can increase its holdings of
liquid assets. These asset holdings can be thought
of as liquidity buffer stocks. Absent these sources
of liquidity, the bank becomes more likely to be
forced to meet its obligations through the sale of its
less liquid loans.
The adverse selection premium described earlier
amplifies the value of maintaining these buffer stocks.
Banks unable to provide credible signals for their
valuations of loans put up for sale will generally find
that these loans must be sold at a discount to the
banks assessed valuations. The difference between
the market price and the banks valuation is the adverse
selection premium, which compensates purchasers for
the risk that the bank is selling its weakest loans. Such
revenue shortfalls can impair the ability of the bank
to meet its financial obligations. To avoid this outcome,
the bank can sell inventories of liquid assets without
a discount and use the proceeds to fund its other
obligations. Then the bank faces an inventory problem.
It must maintain an inventory of liquid assets suffi-
cient to meet its future loan loss experience. However,
investments made in this inventory generally yield a
lower return than the banks other uses for its funds.
So, the bank incurs an opportunity loss for maintain-
ing an inventory of loan loss reserves. The previous
section showed that credit derivatives mitigate this
opportunity loss in certain circumstances.
In this sense, the credit derivative strategy can
be construed as dynamically provisioning against
loan losses. Contrast this with the static inventory
allocation represented by loan loss provisions. With
credit derivatives, the bank maintains an off-balance-
sheet position that delivers funds as the needs arise,
rather than maintaining a funds inventory. The just-
in-time arrival of funds via a credit derivative contract
fulfills the need for immediate funds to meet financial
obligations. Like manufacturing firms that adopt just-
in-time inventory systems, banks may find this a
cost-efficient solution to funding their operations.
The value of this alternative inventory method
should be included in the franchise value of the in-
stitution. When claims against this franchise value
are limited to the banks owners, bank managers act
for the owners in their inventory decisions. These
agents add value when their allocation decisions use
credit derivatives to reduce the opportunity cost of
carrying inventories of lower-yielding liquid assets in
place of higher-yielding loans.
Policy implications
The conclusions outlined in this article have
implications for the regulatory policy afforded to
credit derivative contracts. Below, I describe current
regulatory policy on capital requirements. See
Watterson and Bahlke (1997) for a more comprehensive
treatment of the legal and regulatory issues involved
in credit derivatives.
Regulatory policy toward credit derivatives
Regulatory capital is broken into tiers. Tier one
capital, required to be no less than 4 percent of risk-
weighted assets, is an institutions net worth.14 Tier
two capital includes these items plus other market
issuances, but also includes provisions for loan losses
subject to two limitations. The first limitation is that
loan loss provisions included as capital cannot exceed
1.25 percent of gross risk-weighted assets. The second
is that the total value of these provisions cannot
exceed that of all other forms of tier two capital. With
tier two capital requirements at 8 percent of risk-weight-
ed assets, loan loss provisions are an important com-
ponent of regulatory capital. Proponents of RAROC
(risk-adjusted return on capital) and similar mechanisms
argue that, on correctly risk-adjusted bases, tier two
capital levels generally should be around 5 percent.
This implies that institutions presently having excess
balances of liquid assets are bearing a large cost for
holding these balances. One can expect banks to seek
to lower their costs by pushing for regulations that
permit substitution of credit derivative contracts for
loan loss provisioning.
The Bank of England published a provisional
letter on credit derivatives in late 1996. British regulators
classify bank assets as trading book or loan book.
Capital charges for loan-book assets are larger, reflect-
ing their lesser liquidity. The Bank of England judged
the credit derivative market to be insufficiently liquid
to permit the more favorable trading-book classification.
To the extent that regulatory capital requirements are
binding on these institutions, this view limits use of
credit derivatives.15
In the U.S., the Federal Reserve and the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) have taken
different paths. The OCC holds that the credit derivative
market is too new to take broad regulatory measures.
OCC regulators are concerned that moving too quickly
would adversely influence the innovation process.
They are conducting case-by-case evaluations of in-
stitutions credit derivative positions, responding as
appropriate. Since these decisions involve proprietary9 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
information, the trend in these decisions is not apparent.
The OCC seems aware of the potential for increasing
the efficiency of risk transfers and views its case-
by-case approach as supporting this emerging
market segment.
The Federal Reserve has published two guide-
lines on credit derivatives. In addition, a Federal
Reserve economist is considering the potential for
these contracts to increase systemic risk (Duffee
and Zhou, 1998).
The first guideline published by the Fed was
a Supervisory and Regulation Letter (SR 96-17) re-
leased in August 1996. This letter primarily covers
credit contracts held in the banking book, so its ap-
plication pertains primarily to end users of these
contracts. It directs bank examiners to base capital
requirements for a credit contract on the credit exposure
of the reference asset. The letter makes an analogy
between the present treatment of letters of credit and
the Feds intended treatment of credit derivatives;
that is, ascertain the credit exposure of the underlying
credit, determine the proportion of that credit exposure
present in the credit contract, then apply the capital
charge for credit exposures to the product of these.
This treatment does not appear to recognize risk re-
ductions obtained through holding a diversified
portfolio of credits. In addition, the letter identifies
counterparty default on the credit derivative as a
credit exposure and requires capital on this risk, noting
that this aspect will primarily affect dealers.
The second guideline published by the Fed was
a Supervision and Regulation Letter (SR 97-18) released
in June 1997. This letter provides guidance for ex-
aminations of trading accounts. For trading account
positions, banks can use either the standard capital
charge or a capital charge based on risk levels from
an approved internal model. The letter categorizes
trading-book contracts as either open positions,
matched positions, or offsetting positions and identifies
the types of risk for each: counterparty credit risk,
market risk, and credit risk from the asset underlying
the derivative contract. Open positions have exposures
to all three risk types. Matched positions pose only
counterparty credit risk, the other two risk types being
offset. Offsetting positions, for example, positions
whose payouts match in some but not all states, are
similar but the latter two types of risk are mitigated
not eliminated.
The letter directs examiners to classify positions
according to this matrix and apply standard capital
charges. Capital charges for counterparty risk apply
the following rule: If the underlying reference credit
is an investment-grade asset, the equity capital
charge is used; if the reference credit is a speculative-
grade asset, the commodity capital charge is applied.
This treatment does appear to permit consideration of
diversification. The relatively favorable treatment of
credit derivatives for trading book assets vis-à-vis
assets held in the loan book gives banks an incentive
to move assets from the banking book to the trading
book. The strength of this incentive is mitigated by
the somewhat less favorable accounting treatment for
assets held in the trading book.
Economic consequences of current regulatory policy
Excepting bank trading books, regulators have
placed significant restrictions on the use of credit
derivatives. Credit derivatives used to insure assets
held in banking books, that is, most loans, must rep-
licate the loss experience of the loan to obtain re-
ductions in regulatory capital requirements. This
restriction implies that banks incur the full adverse
selection premium as if they had sold the loan. In
addition, the bank can be required to hold capital
against any counterparty risk encountered should
the banks counterparty fail to perform. Thus, the
credit derivative strategy will generally be dominated
by a strategy of selling loans. Therefore, institutions
that have previously maintained inventories of loan
loss provisions will generally find these preferable
to credit derivatives.
The bank can use credit derivatives to hedge
credit risk in assets held in bank trading books. Thus,
credit derivatives can be adopted when the bank is
willing to move assets from the banking book to its
trading book. This change requires the bank to mark
these loans to market. Historically, banks have been
reluctant to mark loans to their market values. This
reluctance implies that capital relief is unlikely.
Duffee and Zhou (1998) make an argument similar
to that of Grossman (1988). The lack of transparency
in the pricing of OTC transfers of credit exposures
can result in inefficient risk-bearing decisions. Imagine
a series of contracts linked in the sense that default
on any one increases the odds of other defaults. Full
transparency insures that investors can accurately
assess the risk and return from investing in these con-
tracts. Less than full transparency implies that some
investors may underestimate risks so that capital
costs for firms creating additional contracts are too
low. This situation can result in excessive contracting
activity. If contracts begin to fail and loss experience
reveals the extent of oversupply, the market value of
outstanding contracts declines. If these failures are
seen as systemic, they could lead to social costs in
the form of government-sponsored bailouts.10 Economic Perspectives
NOTES
The problem can be solved if contract transparency
is increased. However, making credit risk completely
transparent requires revelation of proprietary infor-
mation. The Fed solves this problem by relying on its
bank supervisory functions to control the extent of
this risk. Absent a change in this policy, Fed policy
toward credit derivatives is likely to be determined by
its bank supervision concerns rather than by concerns
over transparency.
Exchange-traded contracts,16 on the other hand,
can improve the transparency of credit derivatives, but
the contracts must be written on observable bench-
marks such as numbers of bankruptcies or bond prices.
As pointed out earlier, the use of benchmarks for
credit exposure involves basis risk.
Conclusion
I have shown that under certain circumstances,
credit derivatives replicate the reduction in credit risk
accomplished by loan loss provisions. Using a one-
period insurance contract to illustrate the functions
of a credit derivative, I compared the costs of credit
derivative contracts and loan loss provisions. When
the loan-provision amount is greater than the cost of
the credit derivative, the bank can increase its loans.
When the additional income from loans exceeds the
risk-adjusted opportunity cost of the loan provisioning,
the bank will find that credit derivatives dominate
loan loss provisions.
I then priced the insurance contract using the
binomial model of Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979).
This price represents a lower bound for the insurance
contract. Credit insurers will require compensation
for any adverse selection. Smith and Warner (1979)
explain the existence of joint benefits from contracts
structured to mitigate contracting problems. One
solution to this adverse selection problem is the speci-
fication of drivers for contract cash flows determined
outside the bank. Use of an externally determined
driver will generally be less well correlated to the loss
experience of any single institution. This creates a
tradeoff between the adverse selection premium and
the cost incurred when the credit derivative fails to
cover the loss experience, that is, basis risk.
A contribution of this article is the identification
of two problems faced by the emerging credit derivative
contract market. The first is the reluctance of bank
regulators to permit relief from regulatory capital require-
ments. The second is that contracts that successfully
avoid adverse selection problems are likely to have
broader appeal. These will generally be contracts
whose payouts are determined by performance indexes
mimicking the loss experience of many institutions.
It follows that liquidity will be greatest for contracts
based on external drivers, further increasing their
cost effectiveness over other forms of credit deriv-
ative contracts.
I have shown how credit derivatives can be used
to lower the capital costs of banks, in particular, their
costs for holding regulatory capital. I have also shown
that credit derivatives can replicate the cash flows pro-
vided by provisioning for loan losses. When this insur-
ance function is accomplished at low cost, the bank
can increase its lending activities. Thus, outlays
made for credit derivatives can dominate the returns
offered by the safe-asset holdings generally used for
loss provisioning purposes.
1KMV are the initials of the three founding partners of the
KMV Corporation, Steve Kealhofer, John Andrew McQuown,
and Oldrich Vasicek. Their method is described in McQuown
(1993).
2Both an overview and a technical description of CreditMetrics
are available on the Internet at www.riskmetrics.com/cm/
index.html.
3For detailed coverage of this product, see the Internet site at
www.csfp.csh.com/csfpfod/html/csfp_10.htm.
4This article covers the use of credit derivatives by financial
institutions. Frost (1997) describes corporate use of these
contracts.
5For a thorough description of the DPC structure, see Remolona,
Bassett, and Geoum (1996).
6This concern is not without merit. Hartmann (1996) points
out that credit derivatives offer a speedier route for increasing
credit risk exposure. Banks may be tempted to use this route to
gamble for resurrection when capital levels are low.
7Certain accounting and tax benefits can also be derived by
retaining title to the underlying assets.
8Implicitly, the covariation between the interest rate and default
probability is also presumed to be zero.
9This is a more restrictive policy than the accountants use of
this term. A later section further develops the idea of loan loss
provisioning.
10This case can also be made by pointing out that the bank can
now choose between the linear combinations of default-free
investments earning r and risky loans earning rL. The bank will
generally value this expansion of its opportunity set.11 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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